Alvaro Calderon

Alvaro Calderon is a PhD student at Stanford. Calderon's work lies in the intersection between development economics, political economy, and economic history. He is particularly interested in understanding the effects of transportation infrastructure, strategies for institutional development, the role of property rights, and the political economy of development policies. He has several projects on these topics in Latin America and the U.S. in both contemporary and historical settings. Prior to Stanford, he received his MA in economics at CEMFI.

King Center Supported Research

2026 - 2027 Academic Year | Graduate Student Fellowship

Effects of Transportation Infrastructure and Access to International Markets on Conflict: Evidence from Peru

We investigate whether transportation-led increases in access to international markets affect civil conflict and related dimensions of development. We study a railroad project in 19th-century Peru and assemble a novel dataset tracking transport investments, conflict measures, and rural land institutions from archival sources. Using a differences-in-differences strategy that compares places with high versus low changes in access, we find a persistent increase in civil violence and property theft, and in the adoption of communal property institutions. The effect is explained by the effects of trade opportunities increasing land values and the lack of state capacity to protect property rights.

2025 - 2026 Academic Year | Graduate Student Fellowship

Can the expansion of transportation infrastructure cause conflict? Evidence of hidden costs from Railroads Construction in 19th

Transport infrastructure is believed to have broad positive effects on economic development. We investigate whether it can have negative impacts in developing countries with low institutional capacity using Peru's 19th-century railroad construction and assembling a large dataset of violent events and land theft during 1866-1946. Our empirical strategy compares connected and unconnected places using three well-established identification arguments and a differences-in-differences strategy. We show large and robust effects on violence and land theft, despite increases in economic activity. This is driven by places without property rights security which also demand more legal protection. These findings reveal hidden costs of transportation infrastructure policy and illustrate how good institutions can alleviate them.