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Daliah Al-Shakhshir

Daliah Al-Shakhshir is a PhD candidate in Political Economy at Stanford University. Her areas of interest are development economics, political economy, and economic history. Prior to Stanford, she worked as a research assistant at the Federal Reserve Board. She holds a BA in Economics and Political Science from Colby College.

Governance and Institutions
Work, Entrepreneurship, and Finance
Gender and Equity

 


King Center Supported Research

2025 - 2026 Academic Year | Graduate Student Fellowship

The Work Permit Regime in Israel/Palestine: Socioeconomic and Political Dynamics

The Israeli work permit system enables Palestinians in the West Bank to work in Israel within quota-regulated sectors, primarily driven by construction and agriculture. This subsection of workers constitutes 15-20% of the West Bank’s labor force, and generally earns twice as much as they would locally. Their employment, however, is regulated by a permit regime that includes age and marital status requirements to determine eligibility. The age threshold dropped from 35 in 2007 to 22 in 2017, while marriage was binding throughout. This then place downward pressure on the timing of marriage. Do changes in the permit policy induce earlier marriage among men, and indirectly among women? If so, what are the effects of changes in marriage market outcomes on the socioeconomic choices of households? Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I compare young cohorts exposed to the policy and old cohorts who are unaffected by the policy, before and after the set of policy changes. I find that men and women are more likely to get married younger in the aftermath of the policy, especially in areas more highly exposed to the policy at baseline.

The permit process additionally lack transparency regarding approval and revocation. Once granted, a work permit is up for renewal at a high frequency, providing ample opportunities for rejection. A common perception among West Bank Palestinians is that any expression of or perceived association with political dissent or activism against Israel might cost one their permit. This could produce pressure to self-censor, both individually and within broader communities. As such, the project seeks to investigate the extent to which these economic opportunities could politically demobilize communities where they are relevant. I seek to explore the effect of this policy on voter turnout in local elections, the incidence of protests, and political attitudes.