Emanuele Colonnelli

Ronald I. McKinnon Memorial Fellowship for Graduate Students | 2016 - 2017 Academic Year

Corruption and Firms: Evidence from Brazil

Corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency represent a major obstacle to the entry, survival and growth of firms around the world. Nevertheless, scholars have also argued the theoretical possibility that corruption “greases the wheel” of bureaucracy, thereby allowing enterprises to overcome inefficient regulations and improve performance. These discussions are fundamental in order to understand whether and to what extent corruption is detrimental to a country’s level growth. Despite the importance of the relationship between corruption, firms, and entrepreneurship for both theory and policy, its understanding remains quite limited. Colonnelli asks the question of whether a large anti-corruption program aimed at reducing government corruption and inefficiency: (i) improves the performance of firms doing business with the government, and (ii) spurs entrepreneurship. In particular, he investigates the private sector impact of a recent Brazilian national anti-corruption program, which started in 2003 and consisted of randomized audits and crackdowns on local bureaucrats and politicians.

Emanuele Colonnelli, Department of Economics

Emanuele Colonnelli is a PhD candidate in economics at Stanford University. His main research focuses on corporate finance and development economics, with a special interest in innovation and the constraints to firm productivity and growth. He is currently working on research projects in Brazil, Ghana, Uganda, and the U.S, he has research and work experience in several other countries including Bangladesh, Malawi, and India. He holds a BSc in economics from the University of Siena, an MSc in economics from Bocconi University. Prior to joining Stanford, he worked as a researcher at IGIER (Bocconi University) and as director and founder of a non-profit organization.

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